Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice

Phenomenology makes unique contributions to scientific practice—concept formation, experimental design, and data collection—but when it comes to explanation, it faces a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena fail to satisfy a central constraint on explanations (the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum), or they satisfy this asymmetry only by merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. Three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science illustrate each contribution to experimental practice while also showing how the explanatory dilemma arises.

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Abstract

Abstract Questions about phenomenology’s role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline.