Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge January 1, 2007 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0009
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSome philosophers deny any gap between physical processes and consciousness, others expect it to close, and some see it as a real divide in nature. This chapter explores a different view: the gap arises from how we think about consciousness, specifically from the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, not from the things themselves.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 95 |
| Key finding | The explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness may stem from the relationship between our concepts, not from an ontological divide. |
Abstract
Abstract Philosophers have reacted in different ways to the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. This chapter explores another reaction to the explanatory gap — those who react in this way agree that there is an explanatory gap, but they hold that it stems from the way we think about consciousness. In particular, this view locates the gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness themselves.