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The Inward Closure Hypothesis: Experience as a World Held from Within

Kenneth L. Searcy

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 28, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20980184 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Consciousness may depend on information being internally held within a self-maintaining field of identity, distinction, binding, self-reference, and repair, rather than merely being processed or entering awareness. The Inward Closure Hypothesis proposes this as a bridge condition for conscious experience, distinguishing information usable by a system from information present as a world for a subject. The account contrasts local, action-oriented self-in-environment with human symbolic worldhood and is positioned alongside global workspace theory, integrated information theory, predictive processing, autopoiesis, enactivism, and self-model theory. The paper does not claim to solve the hard problem of consciousness but identifies a necessary condition for coherence-based accounts.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Closure psychology Bridge graph theory Usable Argument complex analysis
Key finding The Inward Closure Hypothesis holds that consciousness requires information to be internally held within a self-maintaining field of identity, distinction, binding, self-reference, and repair, serving as a bridge condition for coherent experience.

Abstract

This working paper proposes the Inward Closure Hypothesis as a coherence-based bridge condition for conscious experience. It argues that consciousness should not be understood as raw information entering awareness, nor merely as information processed by a system, but as information internally held within a self-maintaining field of identity, distinction, binding, self-reference, and repair. The paper develops a structural account of inward holding as the transition from information usable by a system to information present as a world for a subject. It distinguishes local, action-oriented forms of self-in-environment from human symbolic worldhood, connects the proposal to the author’s Self-Verification Argument concerning absolute nothingness, and positions the hypothesis alongside global workspace theory, integrated information theory, predictive/free-energy approaches, autopoiesis, enactivism, and self-model theory. The claim is deliberately bounded: the paper does not claim to solve the hard problem of consciousness or deduce phenomenal experience from organization alone. Instead, it identifies a proposed bridge condition that any adequate coherence-based account of consciousness must address: how externally describable information becomes self-in-reality held from within.

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