Pluralist neurophenomenology: a reply to Lopes
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09892-4
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA pluralist approach to neurophenomenology holds that multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, and others—are mutually compatible and can each illuminate different aspects of consciousness and its neural correlates. Historical and conceptual arguments show that these frameworks can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways, rather than being in competition. The response to a critique of using neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology illustrates this pluralism, arguing that each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key finding | Multiple theoretical frameworks, including symbolic, dynamical systems, and connectionist approaches, are mutually compatible and can be used together to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. |
Abstract
Abstract Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural activity. Each type of analysis is best suited to specific phenomena, but they are mutually compatible and can inform and constrain one another in non-trivial ways. I use historical and conceptual arguments to elaborate on this type of pluralism as it applies to cognitive science, phenomenology, and neurophenomenology.