This paper connects Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness to Immanuel Kant's philosophy by arguing that the theory's core identity between an experience and its Φ-structure is a constitutive a priori principle, not an empirical hypothesis. Drawing on Michael Friedman's defense of similar principles in physics, the author shows how this principle enables applying mathematical formalism to phenomenology, gives empirical meaning to concepts, and allows scientific testing of predictions. The paper advocates using this neo-Kantian approach to strengthen the epistemological foundations of other mathematical theories of consciousness, making them more transparent and empirically tractable.
Radical Enactivism (REC) faces a structural problem called the Content-Binding Problem: it sharply separates contentless basic cognition from content-involving sociolinguistic practices, making it hard to explain how these different cognitive formats integrate. This integration becomes visible during memory breakdown in Korsakoff's Syndrome. Patients do not merely react to environmental stimuli; they try to coordinate external artifacts with their linguistic narratives. Their failures and self-corrections imply sensitivity to satisfaction conditions beyond skilled interaction. REC lacks an explanation for how socio-normative narrative contents are constrained by the physical environment. Korsakoff's Syndrome shows that human cognition requires representational mechanisms to bind these formats, challenging REC's anti-representational core.