Desires can influence sensory perception, a phenomenon known as wishful seeing. Some philosophers argue that this dependence undermines the epistemic status of sensations, similar to how wishful thinking undermines beliefs, leading to skepticism. This article examines two strategies to counter that argument. One strategy holds that sensations are unlike beliefs, so their dependence on desires does not reduce their epistemic value. Another strategy contends that the influence of desires is limited to later stages of perception, while early vision remains unaffected; attention, which can be controlled and trained, mediates the influence. The article concludes that wishful seeing does not necessarily lower the epistemic status of sensations, and under certain conditions sensations can be rationally accepted, so the skeptical argument is not compelling.
Perceptual mental states can have three types of content: conceptual, non-conceptual detailed (fine-grained), and non-conceptual coarse (coarse-grained). Michael Tye argues that perceptual mental states possess only the third, coarse-grained non-conceptual content. This paper analyzes objections to Tye's position and finds them surmountable, concluding that his theory can be considered reasonable. The main result is the presentation of additional grounds for the theory of non-conceptual content, which offers new insights into perception without depriving it of its epistemological function as a basis for judgment.