Illusionist Theory of Consciousness as a Development of Identity Theory of the Mental and the Physical
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science January 1, 2024 M. Gorbachev 1 citation
An illusionist theory of consciousness claims that phenomenal consciousness does not actually exist—it is an illusion created by introspective distortion of brain processes. This article compares illusionism with identity theory, a form of physicalism from over fifty years ago that identifies mental states with physical states. Both theories are physicalist, deny special mental properties, and argue that belief in the mental arises from error. However, they differ: illusionism rejects a neutral notion of experience, redefines the mind-body problem, denies a real referent for phenomenal language, and offers more epistemologically influential arguments. The author concludes that while illusionism draws on identity theory, it is fundamentally novel and independent.