Imagination, Cognition and Personality
October 1, 1999
Andrzej Kokoszka
9 citations
A questionnaire survey of 295 adolescents and adults distinguished two types of altered states of consciousness. Superficially Altered States (SACS) involve disturbances in reality perception, self-awareness, and cognition, often occurring in everyday life, solitude, or during poor well-being. Profoundly Altered States (PASC) involve experiences related to the absolute, universal, eternal, or existential and religious matters, accompanied by extremely strong positive emotions and significantly fewer cognitive disturbances than SACS. PASC occur mainly in religious contexts. The findings suggest these two categories represent qualitatively different experiences.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
March 1, 1993
Andrzej Kokoszka
8 citations
Waking altered states of consciousness (ASC) are common among Polish university students. In a survey of 174 students, 96 percent reported experiencing Superficially Altered States of Consciousness (SACS), often with positive, pleasant feelings and quietness, while 75 percent reported Profoundly Altered States of Consciousness (PASC), accompanied by extremely strong positive emotions and experiences related to absolute, universal, or existential matters. SACS occur in everyday situations, whereas PASC arise mainly in religious or natural contexts. The findings support an integrated model of consciousness suggesting a natural, cyclical occurrence of differentiated waking states.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
September 1, 2005
Thomas Natsoulas
James argues that consciousness is not a substance but is constituted of 'pure experiences' that are neither mental nor physical but can be taken as either. A key feature is direct acquaintance with one's experiences, which forms the basis of all knowledge. For example, knowledge of the sun arises from taking certain experiences as that physical object, due to their context among other experiences that are also objects of inner awareness.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
October 1, 2003
Thomas Natsoulas
William James's later theory of consciousness, presented in his article 'Does Consciousness Exist?', reconceives the stream of consciousness as composed of 'pure experiences' that are neither mental nor physical but can be taken as either. A key feature is direct acquaintance with one's own experiences, which grounds all knowledge. For example, knowing the sun involves directly experiencing certain phenomena and, within a context of other inner experiences, interpreting some of those experiences as the physical sun itself. The article examines James's own statements about his intentions and closely analyzes his new conception.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
September 1, 2000
Thomas Natsoulas
Blindsight, a neurological condition caused by visual-cortical lesions, can be interpreted through William James's conception of the stream of consciousness as presented in The Principles of Psychology. This Jamesian interpretation assigns no role to unconscious mental occurrences; instead, the deficiency of blindsight lies in the total brain process producing states of consciousness whose intrinsic visual-perceptual dimension is inaccessible or unreliably accessible to immediate apprehension. The author elaborates this interpretation to clarify the kind of conception of consciousness James was developing, despite disagreeing with some of its theses.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
October 1, 1996
Thomas Natsoulas
This philosophical paper examines the relationship between consciousness and self-awareness through the lens of William James's "The Principles of Psychology." It clarifies different senses of consciousness and explores James's concept of personal consciousness, particularly how the durational components of a stream of consciousness cohere without spatial location, given James's mind-body dualism. The author argues that continuities of content, especially bodily feelings intrinsic to each component, unify the stream. The diachronic unity of consciousness heavily relies on self-awareness. The paper also addresses inner awareness—immediate awareness of one's own mental occurrences—and questions whether remembering past experiences requires both inner awareness at the time of occurrence and self-awareness.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
October 1, 1995
Thomas Natsoulas
William James's concept of 'ejective consciousness' holds that in altered states, mental events can split off from a person's main stream of consciousness to form a second, equally conscious and personal stream. Unlike nonconscious mental occurrences, which James argues cannot exist because they lack inner awareness, this second stream has its own inner awareness of its basic durational components. The original stream can only know the second stream indirectly, through inference, and the same applies in reverse. James thus distinguishes between split-off conscious streams and the nonconscious mental, which he rejects.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
September 1, 1995
Peter L. Nelson
The Tellegen Absorption Scale, widely used to measure personality Trait Absorption, may not adequately distinguish true capacity for absorption or the opportunity for absorptive experiences. This study adds Capacity and Opportunity subscales to the scale and uses Principal Components Analysis to generate five useful sub-dimensions. Building on the author's earlier suggestion linking Trait Absorption to cannabis use and depression, an exploratory study examined how cannabis use, gender, self-perceived motivation loss, and depression relate to overall Absorption, Capacity, and Opportunity.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
June 1, 1995
Thomas Natsoulas
This philosophical article examines William James's concept of "ejective" consciousness from his work The Principles of Psychology. James proposes that during altered states, and possibly at other times, mental occurrences can split off from an individual's primary stream of consciousness, forming a second stream that is equally conscious and personal. While James rejects the existence of nonconscious mental occurrences that lack inner awareness, he accepts that a second stream of consciousness can exist alongside the first. Each stream has inner awareness of its own durational components, but can only have inferential knowledge of the other stream.
Imagination, Cognition and Personality
September 1, 1994
Peter L. Nelson
The so-called cannabis "amotivation syndrome" may not be a single disorder but instead a change in cognitive style arising from cannabis's ability to facilitate a unique attentional state favored by individuals with higher levels of the personality trait "absorption." When this absorptive cognitive style is exaggerated through cannabis use in the context of pre-existing or reactive depression, it may be mistakenly categorized as amotivational syndrome.