Synthese
January 26, 2026
Celia R. Blaise
A recurring finding in psychedelic-assisted therapy is that the subjective intensity and quality of the psychedelic experience contribute more to therapeutic outcomes than the administered dose. Many explanations appeal to what these experiences reveal or enable, such as acquiring mental representations, expanding awareness, or revising beliefs about the self and the world. This paper argues that even if psychedelics work by loosening beliefs or expanding awareness, this alone does not explain why resulting changes should be beneficial rather than neutral or harmful. Existing theories risk describing processes that could worsen distress as easily as alleviate it. The author argues that without a positive shift in affective valence, there is no clear reason why psychedelic experiences should lead to therapeutic outcomes.
Synthese
November 5, 2025
Christopher Kochevar
Psychedelic experiences, though linked to therapeutic benefits for depression and other mood disorders, remain poorly understood. This paper argues that the epistemic dimensions—how knowledge and understanding are gained—should be examined more closely. It proposes a tripartite framework of three phenomenological regularities: fascination, revelation, and improvisation, relating them to everyday epistemic phenomena like curiosity, insight, and intellectual playfulness. Using first-person accounts, the author argues that psychedelic experience, while extraordinary, is best understood as a modification of familiar cognitive processes. The paper concludes with recommendations for new clinical measurement approaches in psychotherapeutic settings.
Synthese
June 19, 2026
Danilo Manca
Neither minimal nor narrative conceptions of the self are inherently tied to either the manifest or the scientific image of the world; both can support either framework depending on how they are articulated. The article reconciles phenomenological–enactive accounts of minimal selfhood with non-eliminativist neurobiological models, arguing that neuroscience's appeal to mental images often uncritically transfers metaphors from the manifest image into the scientific one. It reconsiders the narrative self through niche construction theory, proposing that language is a form of second nature grounded in embodied sense-making rather than a break with biological selfhood. Four kinds of primacy are distinguished—ontological, epistemological, heuristic, and pragmatic—and a synoptic integration of both images is held to be both possible and philosophically necessary for an adequate account of selfhood.
Synthese
May 11, 2018
David Jenkins
Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument claims that no significant mental states are luminous—that is, whenever one is in such a state, one must know that one is. This paper argues that even if Williamson's argument succeeds for mental states, it does not rule out luminous mental events and processes, such as judging or deliberating. These are plausibly self-conscious: if one is judging, one must know that one is. The author contends that Williamson's argument fails to address this possibility, limiting its scope. A misplaced focus on mental states, rather than events and processes, has obscured this limitation. The paper concludes that attempts to extend the anti-luminosity argument to judgment are unsuccessful.