Conflicting images of the self: A metaphilosophical inquiry into the constitution of selfhood
Synthese June 19, 2026 Danilo Manca
Neither minimal nor narrative conceptions of the self are inherently tied to either the manifest or the scientific image of the world; both can support either framework depending on how they are articulated. The article reconciles phenomenological–enactive accounts of minimal selfhood with non-eliminativist neurobiological models, arguing that neuroscience's appeal to mental images often uncritically transfers metaphors from the manifest image into the scientific one. It reconsiders the narrative self through niche construction theory, proposing that language is a form of second nature grounded in embodied sense-making rather than a break with biological selfhood. Four kinds of primacy are distinguished—ontological, epistemological, heuristic, and pragmatic—and a synoptic integration of both images is held to be both possible and philosophically necessary for an adequate account of selfhood.