Neuroscience of Consciousness
September 24, 2025
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, S. Fink, Morten S Overgaard
In the study of consciousness, multiple competing hypotheses about the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are usually treated as mutually exclusive, with the expectation that only one will ultimately be correct. This paper proposes an alternative view: each hypothesis and its associated evidence may be simultaneously valid. The authors develop the multiple generator hypothesis (MGH), which distinguishes between principles—ways consciousness can be brought about—and generators—how these principles are implemented in physical systems. The MGH is explicated and illustrated with examples from consciousness studies, and its implications are shown to raise novel questions and considerations for the field.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 4, 2025
S. Kotler, D. Parvizi-Wayne, Michael Mannino et al.
Flow and intuition are both rooted in nonconscious information processing but differ in their roles in action and cognition. Intuition is a rapid, nonconscious decision-making process, while flow enables optimal cognitive control and performance without conscious deliberation. Using a revised dual-processing framework and an active inference perspective, the authors reconcile the paradox of enhanced intuition during flow—a state of heightened cognitive control. The account advances understanding of human cognition and consciousness and raises questions for future research on harnessing flow and intuition to improve performance and wellbeing.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
July 12, 2024
P. Pérez, D. Manasova, B. Hermann et al.
A framework is introduced that characterizes neuronal markers of consciousness along two dimensions: how well they distinguish conscious from non-conscious states (x-axis) and how well they distinguish different conscious contents (y-axis). Using electroencephalography markers of connectivity, complexity, and spectral summaries, the framework is applied to healthy participants during a nap and patients with disorders of consciousness for the state dimension, and to healthy participants in visual awareness and auditory local-global paradigms for the content dimension. Separate clusters of markers with correlated and anticorrelated dynamics emerge, highlighting the complex relationship between the state and content of consciousness and the need to consider them together.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2024
Ryota Kanai, Ippei Fujisawa
The paper introduces 'Universality' as a desirable property for theories of consciousness, borrowed from physics, where fundamental laws apply consistently everywhere. Universality requires that a theory can determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious, based on intrinsic properties rather than external interpretation. Most current theories lack this property, as they focus on neural correlates of consciousness in brain-centric systems. The authors argue that functionalist theories could become universal by specifying mathematical formulations of their concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories remain useful, a universal theory is needed to fully explain why certain systems possess consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
October 5, 2023
Marlo Paßler
An alternative method for studying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) is proposed, called the exclusionary approach. Instead of comparing conscious and unconscious trials near the threshold of perception, this approach relies on the assumption that subjective reports are reliable under normal conditions. By keeping consciousness stable while manipulating other factors like reports, tasks, stimulation, or attention, researchers can exclude certain neural activities as candidate NCCs. This yields less contentious results and provides hard criteria for theories of consciousness. The approach does not require new paradigms but can incorporate existing studies. It complements, rather than replaces, the standard identification approach.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
April 13, 2023
Bjørn Grinde
Consciousness is a biological feature of advanced brains, and explaining it requires first defining its functional role—why it was selected—and then tracing its evolutionary trajectory. Reasonable models exist for both aspects, offering a strong explanatory framework, though further research is needed to substantiate them.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
Tahnée Engelen, R. Mennella
The paper presents a balanced overview of cognitive and precognitive approaches to emotional consciousness, examining how different theories explain the experiential quality of feeling an emotion. It reviews the evidence supporting these theories, noting methodological challenges unique to studying emotional consciousness and what can be learned from research on perceptual consciousness. The authors identify three key experimental contrasts necessary for investigating neural correlates of emotional consciousness, each with its own limitations. They conclude by highlighting promising avenues that may help overcome current impasses and advance collaborative understanding of emotional consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
R. Ambron
Pain is a conscious sensation that can be studied more tractably than general consciousness. Three neural systems are required: the somatosensory system relays injury information to the thalamus, where awareness of injury arises without painfulness; the affective system modulates pain intensity; and the cognitive system directs attention. Imaging reveals two essential cortical circuits for pain and attention in the anterior cingulate cortex, activated when high-frequency input induces long-term potentiation at synapses on pyramidal neuron apical dendrites, involving AMPA and NMDA receptors and type-1 adenylate cyclase. The apical dendrites form a network where serious injury input produces a local field potential. The author proposes experiments in mouse models to test whether this local field potential is necessary and sufficient for pain consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
Marek Havlík, J. Hlinka, M. Klírová et al.
The science of consciousness has largely relied on identifying neural correlates of conscious experience, but this approach has not yet yielded a mechanistic understanding. Advances in brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation, now make it possible to move beyond correlation and toward causal explanations. By directly altering neural activity, researchers can test hypotheses about the mechanisms that generate conscious states, overcoming the limitations of purely observational methods. This shift promises to advance the empirical study of consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
M. Farisco, J. Changeux
The global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) and the perturbational complexity index (PCI) are largely compatible frameworks for understanding conscious processing. GNWT holds that consciousness depends on long-range connections between cortical regions, enabling amplification, global propagation, and integration of brain signals. PCI, though developed within integrated information theory, aligns with this core idea. Some limited incompatibilities and apparent differences exist, but the paper concludes the two are fundamentally compatible, with certain points requiring further examination.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
Juan Diego Bogotá, Z. Djebbara
Time is central to both science and daily life, yet computational models of consciousness usually treat time as a sequence, not a continuous flow. This creates a problem for computational phenomenology, which combines phenomenology with computational modeling. By analyzing the active inference framework's temporal structure, the authors show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with sequential time. A Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time asynchronously. The authors conclude that active inference qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations regarding time.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2023
Dylan Ludwig
Consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing, including increased capacities for semantically processing complex visual stimuli, increased spatiotemporal precision, and increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This position, called functional pluralism, argues that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species. The analysis consolidates research from across the cognitive sciences to compare visual system capabilities with and without conscious awareness, yielding functional markers that may guide future research in philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by global workspace theory or information integration theory.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
April 1, 2022
Nike Walter, T. Hinterberger
Meditation states produce distinct patterns of brain activity measurable by nonlinear complexity and critical dynamics. Highly proficient meditators were measured with EEG during three meditation conditions (thoughtless emptiness, presence monitoring, focused attention) and compared to resting and reading. Compared to eyes-closed rest, emptiness and focused attention showed higher entropy and fractal dimension, while long-range temporal correlations decreased across all meditation conditions. The critical exponent was lowest for focused attention and reading. Gamma-band activity, global power spectral density, and sample entropy best discriminated among states (accuracy 0.83–0.98, 0.78–0.96, and 0.86–0.90 respectively). Meditation states can be quantified by neuronal complexity, long-range temporal correlations, and power law distributions in neuronal avalanches.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 21, 2022
Aaron Schurger, M. Graziano
Consciousness is inherently subjective, making it difficult to study with objective scientific methods. The search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) has been a productive workaround, focusing on brain activity reliably linked to conscious experience. However, this approach was never meant to explain consciousness, only to sidestep the challenge. The authors argue that most modern accounts of consciousness are not true theories but rather laws that describe what they cannot explain, analogous to Newton's description of gravity. They contend that attention schema theory is an exception, qualifying as an explanatory theory that goes beyond mere description.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2022
T. Niikawa, Katsunori Miyahara, H. Hamada et al.
The paper develops a conceptual framework to clarify theories about the functions of consciousness, organizing them along three dimensions: target (the kind of consciousness addressed), explanatory order (how consciousness and function relate causally or conceptually), and necessity/sufficiency (whether consciousness is necessary, sufficient, both, or neither for a given function). Applying this framework to existing scientific and philosophical theories demonstrates its usefulness for comparing, assessing, and potentially integrating diverse accounts of what consciousness does.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2022
Diane Derrien, Clémentine Garric, C. Sergent et al.
Blindsight refers to preserved visual abilities in people with damage to the primary visual cortex who report no visual awareness. This phenomenon has been crucial for studying consciousness. Two main models have been proposed: blindsight as perception without consciousness, or as degraded conscious vision. This article re-examines the debate using recent findings. It defines blindsight subtypes—type I, type II, and blindsense—and stresses the need for sensitive methods to reveal dissociations between perception and awareness. The authors argue that the patterns of dissociation are richer than either model suggests, and they discuss implications for current theories of consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2022
A. Arena, B. E. Juel, R. Comolatti et al.
Activity in the posteromedial cortex correlates with the brain's capacity for consciousness, as measured by the Perturbational Complexity Index state-transition (PCIST), during different depths of ketamine anaesthesia in rats, independently of behaviour. PCIST was only slightly reduced from wakefulness to light anaesthesia but dropped significantly with deeper anaesthesia. The high-dose effect was selectively associated with reduced high frequency/low frequency ratio in the posteromedial cortex, which strongly correlated with PCIST. Behavioural unresponsiveness from light anaesthesia was associated with similar spectral changes in frontal, not posterior, regions.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
December 1, 2021
B. Hermann, A. Sangaré, E. Munoz-Musat et al.
Patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC), such as vegetative state (VS) or minimally conscious state (MCS), offer a unique way to test theories about consciousness by dissociating vigilance from conscious experience. This article reviews major findings in DoC research, proposes a taxonomy, and highlights limitations. A purely behavioral approach is insufficient to assess conscious state. Comparing MCS and VS does not provide a clean contrast between conscious and unconscious states. Based on resting-state PET data, behavioral MCS reflects a cortically mediated state that does not necessarily imply preserved consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
October 28, 2021
Andrea Lavazza
Human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are three-dimensional lab-grown models of early brain development that already show electrical activity, sensitivity to light, and the ability to connect to spinal cord tissue to trigger muscle contraction. At 10 months, their network activity resembles preterm babies' EEG patterns. Given rapid progress, HCOs might become a living laboratory for studying consciousness and testing neuroscientific theories. The author proposes research lines to investigate conscious states using HCOs and discusses ethical issues that may require strict regulation.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
October 1, 2021
N. Tsuchiya, H. Saigo
Characterizing consciousness directly is notoriously difficult. This paper proposes an alternative approach: defining consciousness through its relationships to all other consciousness, using category theory. The Yoneda lemma proves that two objects in a category are equivalent if and only if all their relationships to others are identical. The authors introduce key category theory concepts for consciousness researchers and propose several possible definitions of categories of consciousness, in terms of level and contents, using simple examples. They suggest using the categorical structure of consciousness as a gold standard to formalize empirical research, such as color qualia structure at fovea and periphery, and to empirically test theories of consciousness.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
May 1, 2021
C. Fields, J. Glazebrook, Michael Levin
A scale-free theory of consciousness and cognition is proposed that applies to any physical system, from bacteria to synthetic constructs, without requiring a neural substrate. The approach, grounded only in quantum information theory, shows that concepts like integrated information, small-world networks, and Bayesian inference emerge naturally from thermodynamic constraints of classical computation. Phenomena such as stigmergic memory, perceptual coarse-graining, and attention switching follow directly from these constraints. The self-representation underlying human autonoetic awareness is traced back to the stress response in bacteria, suggesting a common functional basis across all scales of organization.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2021
S. H. del Pin, Zuzanna Skóra, K. Sandberg et al.
Most research on consciousness tests only a single theory, and when theories are compared the comparisons are often verbal and non-systematic, which may contribute to the lack of convergence in the field. The authors argue that meaningful comparisons require evaluating whether predictions are parallel or contrasting, and they examine why direct comparisons are rare, suggesting the unique nature of consciousness itself as a possible explanation. They conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness and specify the features a theory of consciousness must account for.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2021
Lachlan Kent, M. Wittmann
Many dominant theories of consciousness focus on brief, static, and discrete functional moments of time, neglecting the extended, dynamic, and continuous nature of conscious experience. Experience flows through a succession of moments, from future predictions to present experiences to past memories. This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous time is a core issue in consciousness research. Studying time consciousness could test novel predictions of rival theories, and different theories may be compatible if different aspects of time are considered. The crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2020
Martin Fortier-Davy, Raphaël Millière
Bayne and Carter argue that psychedelic-induced consciousness does not fit the traditional view of modes as levels of consciousness, supporting instead a multi-dimensional account where modes differ along several dimensions without a linear ordering. The authors discuss the assumption that psychedelics induce a single mode of consciousness and raise conceptual issues with the traditional account. They also pose questions about how to individuate the dimensions that differentiate modes of consciousness, suggesting these could be addressed in future discussions of the multi-dimensional account.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2020
A. Valencia, Tom Froese
Neural oscillations synchronize across brains during meaningful social interaction, and this inter-brain synchronization correlates with subjective reports of social connectedness, engagement, cooperativeness, social cohesion, and self-other merging. These findings challenge the view of human consciousness as essentially first-person singular and private. The authors argue that evidence of inter-brain synchronization in the fastest frequency bands overcomes the most convincing skeptical position against extended consciousness. If correct, this would profoundly transform understanding of human consciousness. The authors propose a method to test this proposal experimentally.