The paper identifies a phenomenon called the paradox of moral perception: perceiving others as moral subjects is both effortless and often successful, yet also difficult and frequently fails. Using enactivism—a framework emphasizing embodied and environmentally embedded cognition—the author explains this paradox. The analysis connects enactivism with David Hume's and Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy and insights from epistemic injustice. Two forms of moral misperception are introduced: particular moral misperception (misseeing a specific moral feature) and categorial moral misperception (misseeing someone as not a moral subject at all). The argument highlights overlooked embodied and socio-technical dimensions of ethical life.
The paper argues that hostile environments for disabled people arise from an ableist Cartesian sociotechnical imagination that separates mind from body and devalues disabled body-minds. By integrating enactive embodied cognition and critical disability studies, the authors propose a framework that disrupts this imagination, emphasizing the interdependence of body, mind, and environment. They suggest that recognizing the dynamic, relational nature of embodied experience can challenge ableist assumptions and foster more inclusive sociotechnical systems. The work offers a theoretical intervention rather than empirical findings.