Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)
July 1, 2016
Michael J Hove, Johannes Stelzer, Till Nierhaus et al.
99 citations
Trance, an absorptive state with narrowed external awareness used by shamans for insight, was studied with fMRI in 15 experienced shamanic practitioners listening to rhythmic drumming. During trance, three brain regions—posterior cingulate cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and left insula/operculum—showed stronger hubs (higher eigenvector centrality). The posterior cingulate cortex, a default network hub for internal thought, coactivated with control-network regions, suggesting amplified internal neural streams. Auditory pathway seeds were less connected, indicating perceptual decoupling from repetitive drumming. This network reconfiguration may support extended internal thought and insight.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
March 23, 2022
Björn Merker, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf
The authors respond to commentaries on their critique of integrated information theory (IIT). They first identify the main themes in the commentaries, then address two outlier views: that the problem of consciousness is solved or intractable. They discuss how non-IIT authors engage with the specifics of their critique, and finally respond to commentaries by IIT authors themselves.
The Behavioral and brain sciences
May 19, 2021
Björn Merker, Kenneth Williford, David Rudrauf
Integrated information theory (IIT) proposes that consciousness is identical to integrated information, measured by phi (Φ). Analysis of the formal properties of Φ shows it actually measures the causal efficacy of differentiated networks in accomplishing global information transfer, not consciousness itself. This misidentification leads IIT to attribute consciousness to systems such as electrical power grids, gene-regulation networks, electronic circuit boards, and social networks—a consequence the theory embraces, moving toward panpsychism. The cortical combination of differentiation with integration that IIT equates with consciousness performs a different function in humans. Recognizing this functional misattribution avoids a departure from science and offers lessons for research on consciousness from formal and neural perspectives.