Self-Consciousness without an “I”: A Critique of Zahavi’s Account of the Minimal Self
Research in Phenomenology February 21, 2022 Lilian Alweiss 4 citations
This paper argues against Dan Zahavi's claim that every conscious experience includes a minimal sense of self. Zahavi asserts that even pre-reflective experience has a qualitative aspect—a sense of "for-meness" or "mineness"—indicating it is for me. The author contends that on the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent and involves only one phenomenon, not two. While conscious experience may be reflexive in relation to the self, it does not additionally require a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. The author further argues that Zahavi misinterprets Edmund Husserl, who held that consciousness is a form of self-consciousness without necessarily implying a sense of ownership or an abiding self.