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Jonathan Schooler

3 papers in the library · 63 citations · publishing 2008-2024

Papers

Where's My Consciousness-Ometer? How to Test for the Presence and Complexity of Consciousness.

Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science July 1, 2022 Tam Hunt, Marissa Ericson, Jonathan Schooler 52 citations

As tools for measuring consciousness emerge, there is no settled theory of what they measure. This article categorizes tests that infer the presence and complexity of phenomenal or subjective experience, proposing a taxonomy of measurable correlates of consciousness (MCC) with three subcategories: neural, behavioral, and creative correlates. It also suggests ways different theories of consciousness might be empirically distinguished and reflects on how broader philosophical views, such as materialism and panpsychism, could be informed by scientific evidence.

Editorial: Electromagnetic field theories of consciousness: opportunities and obstacles.

Front Hum Neurosci March 1, 2024 Tam Hunt, Mostyn Jones, Johnjoe Mcfadden et al. 11 citations

This editorial examines the potential of electromagnetic field theories to explain consciousness, highlighting both promising avenues and significant challenges. It discusses how neural electromagnetic fields might integrate information across brain regions, offering a framework for conscious experience. However, it also addresses obstacles such as the lack of direct causal evidence and difficulties in testing these theories empirically. The piece calls for interdisciplinary collaboration to refine hypotheses and develop experimental approaches that could bridge theoretical gaps.

Segmenting the stream of consciousness: the psychological correlates of temporal structures in the time series data of a continuous performance task.

Brain and cognition February 1, 2008 Jonathan Smallwood, Merrill McSpadden, Bryan Luus et al.

Principal component analysis of response times during a continuous performance task can distinguish mental states. Three components accounted for 58.8% of the variance in response time data. The second-largest component was a marker for mind wandering: it was stronger under slow stimulus presentation (paralleling the distribution of mind-wandering reports) and more powerful before failures in response inhibition (a behavioral marker of mind wandering) and less powerful before reports of task-focused thinking. The analysis appears to be a viable tool for differentiating mental states and may help identify neural substrates underlying mind wandering.