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Matthew Owen

3 papers in the library · 8 citations · publishing 2019-2025

Papers

The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness.

Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) July 28, 2020 Matthew Owen 8 citations

Mental causation is central to integrated information theory (IIT), which holds that consciousness exists because it is causally efficacious. This article surveys three problems for mental causation—the lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem—and assesses their threat to IIT under different metaphysical commitments. Three versions of IIT are distinguished: reductive, non-reductive, and non-physicalist. The lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening to all versions. Reductive and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining the causal closure principle. Non-physicalist IIT denies that principle but faces the pairing problem, for which a response is briefly outlined. The survey aims to clarify which commitments lead to which problems.

Neural Voices of Patients with Severe Brain Injury?

Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics : CQ : the international journal of healthcare ethics committees January 3, 2025 Matthew Owen, Darren Hight, Anthony G Hudetz

Some brain-injured patients who appear unresponsive can covertly answer simple questions through neuronal responses, raising the possibility of including them in low-stakes medical decisions to protect their autonomy. The warrant for crediting these neuronal responses is analyzed from neurology, bioethics, law, and philosophy of mind. Nonreductive physicalism's causal exclusion problem casts doubt on interpreting neural activity as indicating a conscious response, while a hylomorphism-inspired mind-body powers model supports such interpretation.

Physically Sufficient Neural Mechanisms of Consciousness.

Frontiers in systems neuroscience January 1, 2019 Matthew Owen, Mihretu P Guta

The concept of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is central to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers's influential definition holds that NCC are minimally sufficient for consciousness, but the meaning of sufficiency requires clarification. This article analyzes three relevant types of sufficiency—logical, metaphysical, and physical—and proposes a theoretical approach to consciousness studies based on the appropriate sense of sufficiency. The authors argue that their conception of NCC has important implications for research methodology, neuroethics, and the ongoing search for NCC.