Perceptual reality monitoring errors can lead individuals to confuse imagined experiences with real ones. In two experiments involving 150 participants, confidence ratings aligned with decision-making shifts, indicating failures in distinguishing reality at both perceptual and metacognitive levels. While participants showed overall awareness of their errors, this insight did not correlate with specific trial-level confidence. These findings suggest that confidence does not effectively differentiate between imagination and reality during perception, highlighting the complexity of how we assess our own experiences.
Theoretical predictions about phenomenal consciousness in other beings are often untestable, creating evidential underdetermination. Combined with the moral weight assigned to consciousness, this situation risks turning consciousness science into a marketplace of rationalizations, where theories serve to reaffirm existing social practices and conventions rather than being empirically constrained.
Theoretical predictions about phenomenal consciousness in other beings are often untestable, creating evidential underdetermination. When combined with the perceived moral importance of consciousness, this situation risks turning consciousness science into a marketplace of rationalizations, where theories primarily reaffirm existing social practices and conventions rather than being empirically constrained.