arXiv Preprint Archive
September 25, 2023
Kelvin J. McQueen, Ian T. Durham, Markus P. Mueller
A quantum circuit called a 'Schrödinger's dyad' could place a minimal system into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states, as described by Integrated Information Theory (IIT). The authors prove a structural constraint on standard collapse dynamics: if too few collapse operators govern the system, collapse rates cannot depend solely on qualitative differences between experiences. Avoiding this limitation requires many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for simple systems. This complexity challenges claims that IIT-based collapse theories are especially experimentally tractable, and the difficulty extends to any theory distinguishing experiences using rich internal organization.
arXiv Preprint Archive
September 25, 2023
Kelvin J. McQueen, Ian T. Durham, Markus P. Mueller
A quantum superposition of consciousness, as in Wigner's friend thought experiment, may be possible under integrated information theory (IIT). IIT treats consciousness as a measurable quantity, integrated information (Φ), so a system's consciousness equals its Φ. Using the latest IIT formalism (IIT4.0), the authors analyze the simplest nonzero-Φ system, a feedback dyad, and propose a circuit putting it into a superposition of states. This would correspond to a superposition of conscious states, called "Schrödinger's dyad." Either IIT is false or the dyad is conscious and easily superposed. The simplest consciousness-collapse model predicts this superposition is unstable, collapsing at a rate determined by differences between the superposed conscious states.
arXiv Preprint Archive
May 5, 2021
David J. Chalmers, Kelvin J. McQueen
The idea that consciousness causes the collapse of the quantum wave function, once taken seriously by physicists such as John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but now widely dismissed, is revisited by combining integrated information theory—a mathematical theory of consciousness—with continuous spontaneous localization, an account of quantum collapse dynamics. Simple versions of this combined theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. Versions of the theory can in principle be tested by experiments with quantum computers. The conclusion is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring.
Amber Rose Hopkins, Kelvin J. McQueen
preprint
Perceptual filling-in occurs when the brain inserts visual properties like color or motion into the visual field despite no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces filled/non-filled image pairs that look identical but differ in the amount of filling-in they require. The authors argue these pairs are important for testing theories of consciousness. They review research suggesting filling-in involves brain activity with higher integrated information (Phi) compared to veridical perceptions. The filled/non-filled pairs pose a challenge to integrated information theory, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences should depend on brain processes with identical Phi.