Understanding the mind and its relation to the body depends on how consciousness is defined. The authors argue that an information-theory perspective offers a unified and parsimonious account. They present consciousness as the propagation of information from the past to the future, contrasting with dominant models that treat it as a discrete brain function. Using this lens, they demonstrate that temporal continuity in perception can explain the emergence of volition, subjectivity, higher-order thoughts, and body boundaries without additional assumptions. The work discusses implications for the mind-body question and the appeal of embodied cognition.
The way researchers ask questions about consciousness is shaped by hidden assumptions that constrain possible answers. This paper identifies and tests the assumptions underlying contemporary debates about the neural correlates of consciousness, tracing them to Crick and Koch's 1990 framing. These premises create a sequential, passive view of conscious perception as the product of resolved unconscious processing at a single moment in time. Major debates—about the moment of entry, all-or-none versus graded nature, and report versus no-report paradigms—are driven by consensus on these assumptions. Removing these assumptions resolves some debates and suggests a dynamic, dispersed conception of consciousness, offering a more parsimonious account of conscious perception.