The Hard Problem of Consciousness in the Light of Onto-Gnoseological Uncertainty

The article argues that the 'hard problem' of consciousness, as framed in analytic philosophy, is a pseudo-problem rather than a truly difficult question. Using transcendental-phenomenological and dialectical approaches, and applying the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty, the authors show that the way the problem is formulated inevitably leads to this dead end. By consistently applying this principle, the apparent contradictions in interpreting consciousness dissolve, opening a productive path for both philosophy and natural sciences. The research highlights the methodological value of onto-gnoseological uncertainty for addressing modern philosophical issues arising from scientific advances.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Purpose: The main purpose of this article is to show that the paradigm of viewing the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness in analytic philosophy makes it a pseudo-problem rather than a ‘hard problem’. The objectives of this research included showing the reasons for the authors’ thesis, demonstrating the irreducibility of consciousness as a special layer of reality, and proposing a way to overcome these difficulties.Design/methodology/approach: In this article, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is viewed from the standpoints of the transcendental-phenomenological and dialectical approaches and is analyzed through the prism of the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty.Findings: It is shown that the way of formulating the ‘hard problem’ in the analytical philosophical tradition inevitably makes it a pseudo-problem. At the same time, with the consistent realization of the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty, the antinomy of solutions to the problems of consciousness is eliminated, which opens up a way to a productive solution of problems related to the interpretation of consciousness both in natural sciences and in philosophy.Originality/value: This research reveals the methodological potential of applying the principle of onto-gnoseological uncertainty to the problems that arise in modern philosophy in connection with the achievements of natural sciences.