Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers

Conceivability arguments, which try to show that physicalism is false because we can conceive of a world physically identical to ours but without consciousness, fail if properties are understood as causal powers. By examining three distinct ways of understanding causal powers and their associated modality, the author argues that most physicalist powers theorists need not worry: the conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their ontology. The paper also defends specific powers theories against recent objections, contending that conceiving properties as powerful blocks such arguments unless an implausible form of emergence is true.

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Abstract

AbstractDo conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks conceivability arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true.