Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism.

The mind-body problem, examined at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience, centers on phenomenal consciousness or 'qualia.' Several skeptical arguments challenge the possibility of explaining qualia in purely physical terms: the knowledge argument, conceivability arguments, the multiple realizability argument, and the explanatory gap argument. None of these arguments proves very convincing, so reductive physicalism remains a defensible position, though not the only option. To avoid dogmatism and naivety, such a view requires ongoing conceptual and methodological reflection alongside empirical research.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.