Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?)
Frontiers in Psychology April 24, 2018 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSelf-consciousness is necessary for consciousness. Living systems return to attracting states, which mathematically implies a Lyapunov function that is model evidence (self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (self-information) in information theory. All biological processes perform inference, from evolution to conscious processing. Consciousness arises when self-evidencing has temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, grounding inferences about the consequences of one's actions. Consciousness is inference about one's future—the self-evidencing consequences of what one could do.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Medicine Philosophy |
| Key finding | Self-consciousness is necessary for consciousness, which arises from self-evidencing with temporal thickness or counterfactual depth. |
Abstract
Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it—the answer is yes. This was my response to a question I was asked to address in a recent AEON piece (https://aeon.co/essays/consciousness-is-not-a-thing-but-a-process-of-inference). What follows is based upon the notes for that essay, with a special focus on self-organization, self-evidencing and self-modeling. I will try to substantiate my (polemic) answer from the perspective of a physicist. In brief, the argument goes as follows: if we want to talk about creatures, like ourselves, then we have to identify the characteristic behaviors they must exhibit. This is fairly easy to do by noting that living systems return to a set of attracting states time and time again. Mathematically, this implies the existence of a Lyapunov function that turns out to be model evidence (i.e., self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (i.e., self-information) in information theory. This means that all biological processes can be construed as performing some form of inference, from evolution through to conscious processing. If this is the case, at what point do we invoke consciousness? The proposal on offer here is that the mind comes into being when self-evidencing has a temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, which grounds inferences about the consequences of my action. On this view, consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-evidencing consequences of what I could do.