Felt Reality and the Opacity of Perception

The sense of reality that accompanies perception is distinct from the spatial and sensory contents of experience, as shown by cases of derealization disorder, Parkinson's disease, and virtual reality. The sense of reality is an affective experience similar to a metacognitive feeling, not a feature of the perceived object's spatial or sensory qualities. This account has implications for the debate between Intentionalism and Naïve Realism: because perception is opaque regarding the reality of what is perceived, Intentionalism cannot use the sense of reality to distinguish perception from sensory-like experiences such as imaginings, whereas Naïve Realism can offer an independent explanation of perception's specificity.

Study at a glance

Abstract

We investigate the nature of the sense of presence that usually accompanies perceptual experience. We show that the notion of a sense of presence can be interpreted in two ways, corresponding to the sense that we are acquainted with an object, and the sense that the object is real. In this essay, we focus on the sense of reality. Drawing on several case studies such as derealization disorder, Parkinson’s disease and virtual reality, we argue that the sense of reality is two-way independent from the spatial and sensory contents of experience. We suggest that the sense of reality is an affective experience akin to a metacognitive feeling. Finally, we present a potentially important implication of our account for the current debate between Intentionalism and Naïve Realism. Since perception is “opaque” with respect to the reality of what is perceived, Intentionalism cannot refer to the sense of reality as what differentiates perception from sensory-like experiences such as imaginings. In contrast, Naïve Realism has an independent explanation of the specificity of perception.