Monadic panmentalism, the hard problem of consciousness, and the ingredient problem

The hard problem of consciousness asks why physical processes give rise to subjective experience. Panpsychism, which says fundamental particles have their own forms of consciousness, struggles with the ingredient problem: we cannot understand how micro-level conscious properties combine into human-level conscious experience. This paper proposes panmentalism, the view that every micro-object has an ability to be conscious. This ability, together with physical properties, produces phenomenal properties. To avoid issues with unmanifestable dispositions, the author argues that only simple, fundamental entities possess both the ability to be conscious and phenomenal properties. Panmentalism thus claims to solve both the hard problem and the ingredient problem.

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Abstract

Abstract The hard problem of consciousness, introduced by Chalmers (1995, 2017), reveals that merely dispositional and relational physical properties cannot ground phenomenal properties. Panpsychism attempts to address this problem by positing that micro-objects possess phenomenal properties that ground our phenomenal properties. However, Nagasawa (2021) has argued that panpsychism faces the ingredient problem: we lack a transparent grasp of microphenomenal properties, and as a result, we cannot explain how these microphenomenal properties ground our phenomenal properties. I will argue that a new metaphysical theory about the mind, panmentalism, can solve the hard problem of consciousness and the ingredient problem. This view holds that each micro-object possesses an ability to be conscious. Abilities to be conscious and physical properties produce phenomenal properties. Concerns about unmanifestable dispositions lead to the view that only simples possess the ability to be conscious and phenomenal properties.