Reframing schizophrenia and autism as self-consciousness disorders associating a deficit of theory of mind and empathy with social communication impairments.
Sylvie Tordjman, Macarena-Paz Celume, L. Denis, T. Motillon, G. Keromnes
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews August 1, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.007 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSelf-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are linked to impairments in body self, which disrupt self-other differentiation, theory of mind, and empathy, leading to social communication difficulties. A proposed model suggests that altered or absent intermodal sensory integration—especially visual-kinesthetic-tactile integration—underlies these bodily self-consciousness disorders. This disruption causes problems distinguishing self from others, which in turn contributes to deficits in theory of mind and empathy and impairs social communication. The model offers new avenues for understanding and developing therapeutic strategies for these conditions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Medicine |
| Key finding | Bodily self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia and autism are associated with altered intermodal sensory integration, leading to impaired self-other differentiation, theory of mind, empathy, and social communication. |
Abstract
Prior observations and studies suggest self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), two neurodevelopmental disorders sharing social communication impairments. First, the relationships between schizophrenia and autism are explored regarding social communication impairments. Then, self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia and autism are described and discussed in relation with impairments of body self leading to impairments of self-other differentiation, a deficit of theory of mind and empathy, and their consequences on social communication. Also, neurological dysfunction involved possibly in self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia and autism is presented. In conclusion, a new model is proposed integrating results of studies presented here and stating the existence of bodily self-consciousness disorders in schizophrenia and autism associated with altered/absent intermodal sensory integration (especially visual-kinesthetic-tactile integration). This would result in problems of self-other differentiation, leading in turn to a deficit of theory of mind and empathy as well as social communication impairments. This model opens new perspectives to understand better self-consciousness disorders and social communication impairments in schizophrenia and ASD and to develop therapeutic strategies.