Two Fallacies of Nondual Experience: Ontological Closure and Epistemic Inflation

Nondual experience—where the usual subject–object distinction dissolves—is often mistakenly treated as if it directly reveals an ultimate cosmic consciousness or ground of reality. This paper identifies two symmetrical fallacies: first, interpreting a transformation of the experiential field as proof of an ontologically independent supreme consciousness; second, claiming that one's own realization authorizes such an ontology, even though the experience itself does not warrant that claim. The experience is phenomenologically compelling but ontologically underdetermined, meaning it can support multiple incompatible interpretations. The authors argue that nondual experience does not justify ontological closure, and that distinguishing experience from interpretation and epistemic authority is necessary to avoid overstating what the experience proves.

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Abstract

This paper examines two symmetrical fallacies that shape much of the discourse on nondual experience. The first does not consist simply in giving nondual experience a metaphysical interpretation. Rather, it consists in treating a transformation of the experiential field—especially the suspension of the subject–object distinction and the weakening of perspectival self-centering—as if it directly disclosed an ontologically independent point, ground, or nucleus, often articulated in terms of supreme or cosmic consciousness. The second fallacy consists in adopting such an ontology and then speaking as if it were grounded in one’s own realization, thereby implicitly occupying an epistemic position for which one’s own experience provides no sufficient warrant. What begins as a metaphysical interpretation of an indeterminate experiential field is reintroduced into discourse as if it carried the authority of realization. Both fallacies arise from a common source: the indeterminate character of nondual experience. Introducing the concept of pre-subjective openness, the paper argues that this experiential field is phenomenologically compelling yet ontologically underdetermined. It can support multiple, mutually incompatible interpretations, none of which is uniquely warranted by the experience itself. The central thesis is that nondual experience does not justify ontological closure, and that maintaining the distinction between experience, interpretation, and epistemic authority is essential if epistemic inflation is to be avoided. A metaphysical interpretation may be meaningful or even existentially powerful, but it remains responsible only insofar as it acknowledges its own interpretive status rather than presenting itself as directly delivered by experience.