An AI Prompt for Driving AI Toward the Structural Core of the Qualia Problem IV — Convergence Points, Survival Constraints, Landauer-Type Irreversibility, Event-Formation, Umwelt, and the Structural Template of Feeling —

This paper presents a prompt for AI to address the hard problem of qualia—why experiences like redness or pain feel the way they do. Building on earlier work that derived a structural skeleton of subjectivity from minimal physical and biological constraints (a single body, autonomous action, irreversible time, survival constraints), the author pushes AI to consider when information becomes an irreversible event belonging to a single body. Key concepts include convergence point, survival constraint, information disposal, Landauer-type irreversibility, and Umwelt. The prompt asks whether modes of feeling might be shaped by bodily structure, DNA, and sensory organs, similar to how limb number is determined. The author does not claim a solution but tests AI's ability to move toward the qualia problem.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper is basically a prompt for making AI take a serious swing at the problem of qualia. In Volumes I–III, I dealt with the question: “Where does subjectivity structurally arise in the first place?” The aim was not to place consciousness or subjectivity at the beginning as something mysterious. Instead, the task was to infer the structural skeleton of subjectivity as strongly as possible from minimal conditions such as a single body, autonomous action, irreversible time, the exclusion of multiple candidates, a single history, and survival constraints. In a sense, this series sharpens Occam’s razor almost to its limit. Crank theories usually inflate explanation. They add hidden forces, special substances, cosmic consciousness, or unexplained metaphysical privileges. This series does the opposite. It cuts away the unnecessary until almost nothing remains except structural necessity. If there is anything uncomfortable about it, it may be that this construction looks more scientific than many existing theories of consciousness. It begins from minimal physical and biological constraints, derives a structural location in which subjectivity can arise, and refuses to smuggle consciousness in as an unexplained miracle. But even after getting that far, the most troublesome problem remains. Why does red appear as red? Why does pain hurt? Why does pleasure feel pleasant? This is the problem of qualia, and it is the so-called hard problem of consciousness. In this paper, I deliberately push AI toward that hard problem. Instead of assuming qualia from the start as something mysterious, the prompt asks under what conditions information stops being mere information and becomes an irreversible event belonging to a single body. The key terms are convergence point, survival constraint, information disposal, Landauer-type irreversibility, single history, foregrounding, Umwelt, and the bodily template. Information may not become “feeling” merely by being processed. But when multiple possibilities are compared, selected under survival constraints, and the non-selected candidates are irreversibly erased, the selected information may become foregrounded in the present of a single body. At that point, perhaps information is no longer just data. Perhaps it has become an event. This paper also asks whether modes of feeling themselves may have a “template” shaped by DNA, development, bodily structure, the nervous system, sensory organs, and Umwelt. If we can say that the number of human limbs or spider legs is determined by DNA, development, and bodily structure, then why could we not also ask whether modes of feeling are determined by bodily structure, neural structure, and Umwelt? Of course, I am not claiming that this solves qualia completely. If it were that easy, nobody would still be struggling with the problem. But when this question is given to AI in this form, the thinking can move surprisingly far. This is a highly experimental prompt for testing how far AI can move from the structural skeleton of subjectivity inferred in Volumes I–III toward the core of the qualia problem. Since this is only a preprint, feel free to try it casually. The answers may be more interesting than expected.