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Interpretations of Consciousness

Louis Roy

Toronto Journal of Theology October 1, 2024 DOI: 10.3138/tjt-2024-0021 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Ordinary and mystical consciousness share similarities but also differ in important ways. Two current views of ordinary consciousness are explained and contrasted, followed by two views of mystical consciousness. Daniel Dennett's materialistic reduction of mental phenomena to a biological substratum is discussed; many critics consider his stance a mere postulate taken for granted, though his system is well argued. The article uses a clarificatory dialectic, illustrated by contrasts, and draws on constructive expositions from various authors, with Canadian philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan given prominence. It compares thinkers who are rarely analyzed together.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Epistemology Philosophy Psychology Sociology
Key finding Ordinary and mystical consciousness have similarities and differences, and Dennett's materialistic reduction is critiqued as a postulate taken for granted.

Abstract

This article highlights the similarities and differences between ordinary and mystical consciousness. In the first part, two current views of ordinary consciousness are explained and opposed. Then in the second part, there are explanations of two views of mystical consciousness. The article discusses Daniel Dennett's materialistic reduction of mental phenomena to a biological substratum. Many of his critics consider his stance based on a mere postulate, namely, an initial principle that he took for granted, although I acknowledge that the details of his system are well argued. This article is in a clarificatory dialectic, illustrated by contrasts, spelling out several constructive expositions by a variety of authors, with Canadian philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan given prominence. It compares thinkers who are rarely analyzed together.

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