What Blindsight Means for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness

Many scientists and philosophers assume that what we perceive is identical to what our brain's neural activity represents. This paper challenges that assumption by examining type-2 blindsight, a condition where people can respond to visual stimuli without consciously seeing them. The author argues that in such cases, the person's experience does not have the same content as the neural correlates—the brain represents the stimulus properties, but the person does not experience them. This suggests that the relationship between experience and neural content is more complex than simple identity, even if a deep connection exists.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Do perceptual experiences always inherit the content of their neural correlates? Most scientists and philosophers working on perception say 'yes'. They hold the view that an experience's content just is (i.e.is identical to) the content of its neural correlate. This paper presses back against this view, while trying to retain as much of its spirit as possible. The paper argues that type-2 blindsight experiences are plausible cases of experiences which lack the content of their neural correlates. They are not experiences of the stimuli or stimulus properties prompting them, but their neural correlates represent these stimulus properties. The argument doesn't depend on any special view of what it is for an experience to be of a stimulus or stimulus property. The upshot is that, even assuming there is a deep relationship between experiential content and neural content, that relationship is more complex than simple identity.