The neural correlates of consciousness under the free energy principle: From computational correlates to computational explanation
preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/7gefk
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe free energy principle reframes the search for neural correlates of consciousness by shifting focus from neural states to neural dynamics, and by adding computational correlates defined as probabilities encoded by neural states. This approach addresses two problems: explaining consciousness without sensory input or behavior, and distinguishing systems that genuinely are conscious from those that merely simulate consciousness. The principle-derived constraints help ascribe consciousness in controversial cases, such as during sensory deprivation, and clarify what it means to be a conscious system versus simulating one.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Under the free energy principle, neural correlates of consciousness should be defined in terms of neural dynamics rather than neural states, and supplemented by computational correlates defined as probabilities encoded by neural states, which helps address consciousness in the absence of sensory stimulation and behavior and distinguishes genuine consciousness from simulation. |
Abstract
How can the free energy principle contribute to research on neural correlates of consciousness, and to the scientific study of consciousness more generally? Under the free energy principle, neural correlates should be defined in terms of neural *dynamics*, not neural states, and should be complemented by research on *computational* correlates of consciousness -- defined in terms of probabilities encoded by neural states. We argue that these restrictions brighten the prospects of a computational explanation of consciousness, by addressing two central problems. The first is to account for consciousness in the absence of sensory stimulation and behaviour. The second is to allow for the possibility of systems that implement computations associated with consciousness, without being conscious, which requires differentiating between computational systems that merely simulate conscious beings and computational systems that are conscious in and of themselves. Given the notion of computation entailed by the free energy principle, we derive constraints on the ascription of consciousness in controversial cases (e.g., in the absence of sensory stimulation and behaviour). We show that this also has implications for what it means to *be*, as opposed to merely *simulate* a conscious system.