Individuating Artificial Minds

If an artificial system becomes conscious, it will likely contain many independent minds simultaneously, not just one. This conclusion follows from an analogy with split-brain patients, whose functionally disconnected hemispheres appear to host two distinct minds. Since artificial systems can have even more extreme functional disconnections—for example, separate interactions with different users—each such interaction may realize its own independent mind. This radical multiplicity carries ethical implications for AI design and system updates, and raises the prospect that the sheer number of artificial minds could overwhelm human interests in moral calculations.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues that if an artificial system realizes consciousness, then it’s likely to realize not just one, but many independent minds at once. This view is motivated by analogy to split-brain cases, in which the two hemispheres of a patient’s brain are functionally disconnected. While there are several ways to interpret this phenomenon, it’s highly plausible that split-brain patients have two distinct minds—one per hemisphere. If functional disconnection within a single biological brain can generate multiple minds, then we should say the same about artificial conscious systems, where such disconnections are likely to be even more extreme. Thus, each instance of an overarching artificial conscious system (e.g., a particular user’s distinct, functionally independent interaction with that system) will realize an independent mind, leading to a radical multiplicity of artificial minds. This carries several ethical implications for AI design and system updating. Moreover, it introduces the prospect that human interests may soon find themselves overwhelmed in the moral calculus by an enormous number of artificial minds.