From Museum to Workshop: A Pragmatist Intervention in Science of Consciousness
PsyArXiv December 12, 2025 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/kpe9r_v3
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe field of consciousness research lacks conceptual clarity because theories define consciousness in incompatible ways and lack clear success criteria. This arises from insufficient pragmatic pressure: theories are rewarded for explaining 'consciousness-as-such' rather than solving concrete problems. A pragmatic shift is proposed: focus on models that advance well-defined objectives, remaining neutral about metaphysical commitments. Analogies from stock-market trading and the history of science, such as Newtonian mechanics and relativity offering incompatible yet functional pictures of space and time, suggest that ontologically pluralist frameworks enable genuine progress.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Consciousness research can progress under an ontologically pluralist framework that prioritizes pragmatic problem-solving over metaphysical commitments. |
Abstract
Despite notable empirical advances, the science of consciousness lacks firm conceptual footing. Competing theories not only disagree on mechanisms but also define consciousness in mutually incompatible ways, and criteria for evaluating theoretical success remain vague. I argue that this situation arises from a lack of pragmatic pressure within the field. Theories are rewarded for offering ever more elaborate explanations of “consciousness-as-such” rather than for solving concrete, real-world problems. This paper proposes a pragmatic shift. Rather than beginning with metaphysical commitments about what consciousness truly is, scientific inquiry should focus on developing models that demonstrably advance well-defined objectives. Such an approach does not deny the possibility that consciousness includes aspects beyond scientific access; it takes a neutral stance toward that possibility, holding that scientific practice must be guided by problems with pragmatic relevance and clear criteria of success. Drawing on analogies from stock-market trading and examples from the history of science, I suggest that scientific progress does not require a single, final ontology. Newtonian mechanics and relativity, for instance, present incompatible pictures of space and time, yet both function effectively within their domains. Likewise, consciousness research can proceed under an ontologically pluralist framework, enabling genuine scientific progress rather than endless theoretical disputes.