EVALUATING THE BIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF THE RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

A commentary on the Relativistic Theory of Consciousness identifies two unresolved issues. First, the theory lacks a fundamental precondition for consciousness, which a Comparator Model might address. Second, the theory's biological relevance depends on its real-world applicability, as its mathematical formulation for shifting from a third-person to a first-person frame of reference may be internally consistent but does not prove biological reality. The technological requirements for such a transition and obstacles in real life are discussed.

Study at a glance

Abstract

According to the Relativistic Theory of Consciousness by Lahav and Neemeh, consciousness is not an absolute feature but a relativistic one that depends on the reference system of the observer. The theory offers a new, thought-provoking view on consciousness, but also raises critical issues. First: What is the fundamental precondition of consciousness which the Relativistic Theory may be based upon? Although this aspect does not question the relativistic principle as such, it still remains open. Therefore, a Comparator Model of consciousness will be discussed in relation to the Relativistic Theory of Consciousness. Second: What is the Relativistic Theory’s biological relevance? This solely depends on the theory’s real-world applicability because this is it what the authors fundamentally envisage by their statement that we just need to move to the appropriate frame of reference in order to measure phenomenal properties. Although the mathematical formulation of changing from a third-person to a first-person frame of reference is possible when based on suitable premises, and may well be internally consistent, this does not per se prove any corresponding biological reality. Thus, the technological requirements for such a transition are a most critical issue. The obstacles in real-life will be addressed.