Naturalizing perceptual experience: the explanatory power of probabilistic computation and the holographic solution.

A central obstacle to explaining consciousness is uncertainty about what kind of thing it is—its ontological status. Naturalization requires making every agreed property of consciousness continuous with properties admitted by the natural sciences. The hard problem will remain hard until cortical computation and the mechanisms by which biophysical processes generate phenomenal content are fully understood. This paper evaluates the naturalization project in light of debates in consciousness studies, then introduces a neuro-physically grounded framework for probabilistic neural computation: the holography solution. It offers a concrete account of naturalization, provides explanatory power, and identifies several testable predictions. Even if unconvincing, the proposal demonstrates that naturalization is possible and challenges other theories to deliver alternative accounts of what consciousness is.

Study at a glance

Abstract

When it comes to consciousness, a central problem is a lack of clarity regarding the ontological status of the phenomenon to be explained. What kind of 'thing in the world' is consciousness? In other words, what will a naturalization of consciousness look like? Naturalization requires that every agreed property of consciousness is made continuous with the properties admitted by the natural sciences. In short, the hard problem will remain hard until we fully understand cortical computation, and the mechanisms by which this biophysical process generates phenomenal content. Here, we evaluate the naturalization project in light of extant debates in consciousness studies. Following this, we introduce a neuro-physically grounded framework for probabilistic neural computation and show how it offers a concrete account of the naturalization of consciousness: the holography solution. The explanatory power of this approach is provided, and we identify several testable predictions. Given the scarcity of (even proposals of) naturalization of consciousness in the field, the holography solution constitutes a significant progress for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is a plausible hypothesis about the way the brain produces perceptual experience. Secondly, even if one is not convinced by our proposal, we nevertheless show that naturalization is in fact possible, and challenge other theories to deliver alternative accounts of what kind of 'thing in the world' consciousness is.