Thin, Thinner, Thinnest: Defining the Minimal Self

A self can be defined in many ways, but the author defends a minimal, experientially based conception of selfhood. Responding to objections from Ratcliffe, Ciaunica, and Fotopoulou, the author argues that the minimal self is not interpersonally constituted. The answer to whether it is viable to suggest interpersonal constitution is negative.

Study at a glance

Abstract

What is a self? Plenty of competing and complementary definitions abound. Over the years, I have articulated and defended am experientially based minimal conception of selfhood. In the following short text, I reply to some objections and suggestions for revisions that Ratcliffe as well as Ciaunica and Fotopoulou offer in their contributions to this volume. Is it a viable proposal to suggest that the minimal self is interpersonally constituted? My answer is negative.