Phenomenal Socialism

Phenomenal socialism holds that what people directly perceive is primarily instances of high-level phenomenal properties, not low-level sensory data. This paper defends the weaker, 'primarily' version of that view. It first presents a recognitionalist manifesto and situates it within debates about naturalism, perception, the metaphysics of value, and theory versus anti-theory in ethics. It then reviews two familiar positions on perceptual content—phenomenal conservatism and liberalism—and introduces two neglected alternatives: phenomenal socialism and phenomenal nihilism. The paper defends a watered-down form of phenomenal socialism against four objections. Finally, it connects the view to the epistemology of modality and the role of imagination.

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Abstract

Phenomenal socialism says that what we actually, directly, literally perceive is only or primarily instances of high-level phenomenal properties; this paper argues for phenomenal socialism in the weaker, primarily version. Phenomenal socialism is the philosophy of perception that goes with recognitionalism, which is the metaethics that goes with epiphanies. The first part states the recognitionalist manifesto. The second part situates this manifesto relative to some more global concerns, about naturalism, perception, the metaphysics of value, and theory vs. anti-theory in ethics. The third part rehearses two familiar views about the possible contents of perceptual experience, Phenomenal Conservativism and Phenomenal Liberalism. It notes that the usual catalogue omits two other theoretical possibilities, Phenomenal Socialism and Phenomenal Nihilism, and it defends a watered-down form of Phenomenal Socialism from four main objections. The fourth part makes some connections with the epistemology of modality and with the role of the imagination.