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How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition

Yavuz Recep Başoğlu

Organon F November 29, 2021 DOI: 10.31577/orgf.2021.28402 via Semantic Scholar

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Arguments that Predictive Processing and 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approaches to cognition are compatible often claim either that Predictive Processing is nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. Such arguments are inadequate because they overlook the variety of representational posits in Predictive Processing, the diverse attitudes of 4E practitioners toward representations, and the unconstrained use of the term 'representation' in cognitive science. No single argument depending on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Processing can encompass this heterogeneity. The paper illustrates this criticism by analyzing similar arguments from Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Philosophy
Key finding Arguments that Predictive Processing and 4E approaches are compatible by claiming one is representational or the other nonrepresentational are inadequate due to heterogeneity in representational posits, attitudes toward representations, and unconstrained use of the term 'representation'.

Abstract

In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to posits they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Process is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will argue that such arguments are inadequate for the indicated purpose for several reasons: the variety of representational posits in Predictive Process, the diverse attitudes of practitioners of 4E approaches toward representations and the unconstrained use of the term “representation” in cognitive science. Hence, here I will try to demonstrate that any single argument, if it depends on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Process, falls short of encompassing this heterogeneity in pertinent debates. Then, I will analyze similar arguments provided by Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff to illustrate how destructive this seemingly ordinary criticism is. 778 Yavuz Recep Başoğlu Organon F 28 (4) 2021: 777–801

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