Building a stronger concept of embodiment

After reviewing disagreements about embodied cognition (EC) as a research field, the author distinguishes weak EC, which focuses on brain-based body-related representations, from strong EC, which treats the extraneural body and environment as more central to cognition. Weak EC relies on the neural reuse hypothesis, but the author argues that properly understanding neural reuse actually supports a stronger conception of EC. In this view, extraneural factors—including the body and physical, social, and cultural environments—play essential roles in evolutionary and developmental time frames by constraining how neural reuse works.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract After reviewing some disagreements and worries about embodied cognition (EC) as a research field, I focus on the distinction between weak EC, which focuses on brain-based, body-related representations, and strong EC, which takes the extraneural body and environment to be more central to cognition. An important aspect of weak EC is its reliance on the neural reuse hypothesis. I argue that an adequate understanding of neural reuse actually points in the direction of a stronger conception of embodied cognition where extraneural factors play an essential role in evolutionary and developmental time frames. Both body and the environment (including physical, social, and cultural factors) place important constraints on how reuse works.