Ambivalent Tolman: indirect influence on enactivism of Tolman’s sign-Gestaltism through Merleau-Ponty

Tolman, an experimental psychologist known for cognitive maps and latent learning in rats, is traditionally seen as a precursor to cognitivism because his intervening variables were later interpreted as representational. However, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, especially in The Structure of Behavior, was influenced by Tolman's sign-Gestalt theory, which Merleau-Ponty recast as non-representational and relational. This reinterpretation provided a conceptual foundation for enactivism, which opposes representationalism and emphasizes the co-constitution of perception and action. The paper reexamines Tolman's ambivalent nature, arguing that his work served as a hidden source for both cognitivism and enactivism, challenging the standard narrative.

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Abstract

Tolman, an experimental psychologist renowned for his research on the “cognitive map”and “latent learning” in rats, pursued his career within the tradition of behaviorisms. In thehistory of psychology, he is positioned as a precursor to cognitivism. This is because theconcepts he introduced as intervening variables were later interpreted as having arepresentational nature. On the other hand, the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty wasalso influenced by Tolman's concepts, particularly his theory of sign-Gestalt. Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, especially as developed in The Structure of Behavior, have had a profoundimpact on the notion of embodiment within enactivism. Enactivism, as a school of thoughtopposing representationalism, sharply contrasts with cognitivism, which places Tolman atthe intersection of two opposing intellectual currents. This paper, thus, reexaminesTolman’s ambivalent nature, exploring how it arose and reassessing his ideas as aprecursor not only to cognitivism but also indirectly to enactivism. We argue that Merleau-Ponty inherited Tolman’s concept of sign-Gestalt as having a non-representational natureand utilized it within his relational account of behavior. While Tolman’s own theoreticalframework remained ontologically ambiguous, Merleau-Ponty recast his insights into aconception of behavior as a structured, embodied interaction between organism andenvironment. These reformulated insights subsequently provided a conceptual foundationfor enactivist cognitive science, particularly in its emphasis on the co-constitution ofperception and action, and the dynamic coupling of agent and environment. By tracingthis lineage, we can move beyond the standard narrative and reposition Tolman as anintellectually ambivalent figure whose work served as a hidden source for both cognitivismand enactivism.