A Theory of Information Subjectivity: A Logico-Definitional Foundation

A logico-definitional foundation for the theory of information subjectivity is presented, building on a prior 'field – perturbation – subjective filter' (P-D-S) architecture. Unlike classical theories (Shannon, Kolmogorov), which treat information as objective, this theory defines semantic (semantic-pragmatic) information as the result of interpreting a field perturbation through an observer's subjective filter. Three necessary consequences follow: semantic information requires an interpreter; for a fixed signal, changing the subjective filter can change semantic information; and similar filters produce similar semantic information. The work distinguishes syntactic from semantic information to avoid unproductive debates. Though definitional, its consequences allow empirical operationalization. The theory is compared with classical and contemporary concepts, and its explanatory power is noted for analyzing dreams, mental disorders, cultural perception, and designing meaning-extracting AI systems.

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Abstract

The present work offers a logico-definitional foundation for the theory of information subjectivity, which develops the basic "field – perturbation – subjective filter" (P-D-S) architecture previously laid out by myself. In contrast to classical approaches (Shannon, Kolmogorov), where information is treated as an objective characteristic of a signal or data, the proposed theory defines **semantic (semantic-pragmatic) information** as the result of interpreting a field perturbation through the subjective filter of an observer. Three key consequences follow from this definition with logical necessity: (1) semantic information does not arise in the absence of an interpreter; (2) for a fixed signal, a change in the subjective filter can lead to a change in semantic information; (3) similar filters generate similar semantic information. The work contains an explicit distinction between syntactic and semantic information, which allows one to avoid unproductive debates with physicists, biologists, and proponents of classical information theory. The core of the theory is definitional-conceptual in nature; however, its consequences allow for empirical operationalization. A comparison is made with classical theories of information (Shannon, Kolmogorov, Landauer/Bennett, Carnap/Bar-Hillel, quantum theory, Luhmann, Dervin, Burgin, Yockey, Wiener) and with contemporary concepts (Predictive Processing, Free Energy Principle, Integrated Information Theory, Ecological Information, Active Inference, Embodied Cognition, Enactivism). The scientific value of the theory lies in its explanatory power when analyzing the phenomena of dreams, mental disorders, cultural perception, and in designing artificial intelligence systems oriented towards extracting meaning.