Neurophenomenology of surprise

A recent thermodynamic theory of the central nervous system proposes that its function—and that of living autopoietic units generally—is to minimize surprise by adapting internal organization or ecological niche to maximize predictability and minimize entropy production. The first-person correlate of this minimized-surprise state is plausibly déjà vu or habitual monotony. Contrastingly, philosopher Henri Maldiney describes surprise as a sudden encounter with radically unexpected reality, a concussion for the brain and a risk for the organism, yet lived as an awakening to what exists.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract A theory of the central nervous system was formulated recently, in general thermodynamical terms. According to it, the function of a central nervous system, and more generally of living autopoietic units, is to minimize “surprise”. The nervous system fulfills its task, and the animal maintains its viability, by changing their inner organization or their ecological niche so as to maximize the predictability of what happens to them, and to minimize the correlative production of entropy. But what is the first-person correlate of this third-person description of the adaptation of living beings? What is the phenomenological counterpart of this state of minimal suprise? A plausible answer is that it amounts to a state of “déjà vu”, or to the monotony of habit. By contrast, says Henri Maldiney, surprise is lived as a sudden encounter with reality, a reality that is recognized as such because it is radically unexpected. Surprise is a concussion for the brain, it is a risk for a living being, but it can be lived in the first person as an awakening to what there is.