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Outline of an Uexküllian bio-ontology

Morten Tønnessen

Sign Systems Studies December 21, 2021 DOI: 10.12697/sss.2001.29.2.15 via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Western ontology has traditionally focused only on human experience. This paper argues that a biocentric ontology can be built on Uexküll's Umwelt theory, which expands the study of experience beyond humans. Drawing on Thomas Nagel, the author suggests that some lifeforms may be entirely unimaginable to us, and this view is compatible with Umwelt theory. The paper advocates for a biosemiotic possibilism, urging that claims about universal characteristics of living beings be avoided; instead, statements should be limited to life as we know it.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 5
Key finding A biocentric ontology based on Uexküll's Umwelt theory, combined with a biosemiotic possibilism, should replace anthropocentric ontology by acknowledging that some lifeforms may be unimaginable to humans.

Abstract

Traditionally, ontology, or at least western ontology, bas been an anthropocentric enterprise, that takes only human experiences into account. In this paper I argue that a prolific biocentric ontology can be based on UexkülI's Umwelt theory. UexkülI offers the basis of an ontology according to which the study of experiences is a much wider field than it is as depicted by classical ontology and contemporary philosophy of consciousness. Based on the thoughts of the contemporary philosopher Thomas Nagel I claim that there might very well be Iifeforms that are totally unimaginable to us. I argue that this view is compatible with the Umwelt theory, and that it should be adopted by biosemioticians. Furthermore, I argue that a biosemiotic possibilism should be implemented. Followingly, one should not claim to know which characteristics of living beings are universally and necessarily valid, but restrict oneself to statements about life as we know it.

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