A Phenomenology of Recognition in Psychosocial Interventions for Psychosis
Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology January 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1353/ppp.0.a980380 via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractRecognition, a concept from political philosophy, is applied to mental health care for psychosis. The paper argues that psychosocial interventions should embody a normative stance that acknowledges patients' subjective experiences and fosters mutual, relational recognition between clinician and patient. Drawing on the work of Honneth and Benjamin, recognition is described as an attitude and reciprocal relationship involving intercorporeal and verbal aspects that build trust. A phenomenological understanding of psychosis highlights alterations in self, world, and other. The analysis shows that such a recognizing stance has therapeutic and social potential, emphasizing the importance of the therapeutic relationship in these interventions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Philosophy |
| Key finding | Psychosocial interventions for psychosis can benefit from a normative stance of recognition that validates patients' lived experiences and fosters mutual, relational trust. |
Abstract
The concept of recognition has recently been introduced into the philosophy of psychiatry, particularly through Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed, to discuss the demand for recognition by mental health activists. This paper complements this perspective with a first-person approach, that is, a phenomenological perspective on recognition using the example of psychosocial interventions for psychosis. For this purpose, the normative concept of recognition is introduced, based on the work of Axel Honneth and Jessica Benjamin. It is described as an attitude and form of reciprocal relationship in which intercorporeal and verbal aspects are central, enabling trust in the social world. The paper then introduces a phenomenological understanding of psychosis with its alterations in the experience of self, world, and other. The subsequent analysis of contemporary psychosocial interventions for psychosis is guided by two fundamental inquiries. First, to show the extent in which these interventions embody a normative stance that acknowledges the subjective and meaningful experiences of service users. Second, how these interventions facilitate mutual and relational recognition. The present paper demonstrates the therapeutic and social potential of a recognizing normative stance toward the lived experience of psychosis. Additionally, it underscores the importance of a therapeutic relationship in psychosocial interventions for psychosis.