If insects have phenomenal consciousness, could they suffer?

Klein & Barron's proposal that insects may have phenomenal consciousness challenges the cautious stance of many researchers. While the skeptical view that neural and behavioral parallels between humans and insects need not imply conscious experience cannot be falsified, if Klein & Barron are correct, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. This discussion explores whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, might also be part of the simulated perceptual conscious world they propose. In humans, affect-induced modulation of decision-making leads to cognitive bias, and the question is raised whether this can be observed in animals and used as a novel indicator of animal affect and welfare.

Study at a glance

Abstract

: Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, might also be part of the simulated perceptual conscious world that K & B propose. are influenced by affective state. In humans, affect-induced modulation of decision-making leads to “cognitive bias.” Can it be observed in animals and used as a novel indicator of animal affect (emotion) and welfare?