Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness is often thought to carry special moral weight, making sentience central to animal ethics. The author argues that if materialism about the mind is correct, phenomenal consciousness is probably not especially normatively significant. Therefore, we should accept its likely insignificance and develop an ethics that does not rely on sentience.

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Abstract

Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethics without sentience.