Perception: Where Mind Begins

Representational mind—the capacity for states with veridicality conditions—originates in arthropods, the simplest animals known to exhibit perceptual constancies and perception as a natural psychological kind. Perception, the most primitive representational state, involves objectification and is recognized by perceptual psychology. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception, and its evolutionary beginnings remain scientifically unknown. The argument distinguishes a psychologically distinctive notion of representation from information-based, causal, or functional notions, concluding that representational psychology begins with arthropods.

Study at a glance

Abstract

AbstractWhat are the earliest beings that have minds in evolutionary order? Two marks of mind are consciousness and representation. I focus on representation. I distinguish a psychologically distinctive notion of representation from a family of notions, often called ‘representation’, that invoke information, causation, and/or function. The psychologically distinctive notion implies that a representational state has veridicality conditions as an aspect of its nature. Perception is the most primitive type of representational state. It is a natural psychological kind, recognized in a mature science: perceptual psychology. This kind involves a type of objectification, and is marked by perceptual constancies. The simplest animals known to exhibit perceptual constancies, perception, and representation in a distinctively psychological sense, are certain arthropods. Representational mind, or representational psychology, begins in the arthropods. We lack scientific knowledge about the beginnings of consciousness. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception. I conclude by reflecting on the kinds mind and psychology.