Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function: A Distilled SCT Expression
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 30, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20464883 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractRecognized error feels different from ordinary failure because meaning itself depends on the possibility of relating distinctions in more than one way. A system can only be wrong if alternatives existed. Cognition includes a distinct adjudicative function that preserves alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives. The emotional weight of error reflects the withdrawal of endorsement from a previously trusted distinction—consciousness transitioning from 'yes' to 'no' from within. This is a falsifiable architectural claim: if all alternative-preservation reduces to prediction-error minimization, global broadcasting, or sensorimotor coordination, the adjudicative function would be unnecessary.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognition Function biology Meaning existential Consciousness Expression computer science |
| Key finding | Cognition includes a distinct adjudicative function that preserves alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives. |
Abstract
Description: Meaning, Alternatives, and the Adjudicative Function Core question: Why does recognized error feel qualitatively different from ordinary failure? Central claim: A system can only be wrong if alternatives existed. Meaning itself depends on the maintained possibility of relating distinctions in more than one way. Cognition therefore includes a distinct function — the adjudicative function — concerned with preserving alternative accessibility within a meaning-landscape, a function not exhausted by the truth or utility of those alternatives. Phenomenological anchor: The emotional weight of error reflects the withdrawal of endorsement from a previously trusted distinction — consciousness transitioning from "yes" to "no" from within. What the paper is not: It is not a metaphysical claim about reality, not a neural implementation, not a formal theory of alternatives, and not a complete cognitive architecture. It is a short conceptual essay establishing a falsifiable architectural claim. Falsification: If all apparent alternative-preservation reduces without remainder to prediction-error minimization, global broadcasting, or sensorimotor coordination, the adjudicative function would be unnecessary. Contribution: A distinct, testable proposal about a cognitive function that existing frameworks (predictive processing, Global Workspace theory, enactivism) do not treat as primary. Audience: Cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, consciousness researchers, and theorists of learning, error, and deliberation.