Metaethical implications of illusionism

Illusionism denies the existence of phenomenal consciousness, claiming that conscious experience is merely an illusion. This creates a normative problem: if there are no real phenomenal experiences, then the moral significance we attach to subjective suffering and well-being may be undermined. The author examines proposed solutions from several philosophers and finds each unsatisfactory. Two alternative resolutions are offered: either weaken illusionism to preserve moral realism, or accept antirealist implications for metaethics, meaning moral facts would lack objective foundation.

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Abstract

According to illusionism, there is no phenomenal consciousness, only an illusion of it. Since the phenomenal character of experience plays an important role in explaining and justifying its normative status, illusionism faces a normative problem. The problem is that illusionism, by denying phenomenal experience, potentially undermines our moral commitments. In this article, I defend the normative problem and consider solutions to it proposed by François Kammerer, Keith Frankish, Artem Besedin, Maxim Gorbachev, Artem Iunusov, and Taras Tarasenko. As I show, none of these solutions is satisfactory. I conclude by offering two alternative solutions that either weaken illusionism or accept antirealist implications for metaethics.