The perception paradox: between conscious and unconscious

Perception should be defined by what it does—selecting, representing, and guiding behavior—not by whether it involves conscious experience. This functionalist view allows for both conscious and unconscious forms of perception, which are continuous manifestations of a shared cognitive architecture. Evidence from binocular rivalry, visual masking, and blindsight shows that perceptual processing extends beyond phenomenal limits. The paper argues against Phillips' consciousness-centric definition on three grounds: it excludes empirically supported unconscious perception, wrongly assumes a rigid link between perception and consciousness, and narrows the scope of perception research. A functionally grounded framework bridges philosophy and cognitive science.

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Abstract

Abstract This paper advances and defends an inclusive functionalist conception of perception, according to which any cognitive process that involves information selection, representation—understood in a functional sense as an internal state that carries information about the world and guides behavior and cognition independently of its phenomenal properties—and behavioral guidance qualifies as perceptual, whether or not it is accompanied by conscious experience (specifically phenomenal consciousness, the subjective “what it’s like” aspect), contra Phillips’ consciousness-centric view. By defining perception in functional rather than phenomenal terms, the paper argues for the existence of both conscious and unconscious forms of perception, and clarifies how perceptual mechanisms operate across different levels of consciousness. To support this view, I integrate philosophical analysis with empirical findings from neuroscience and psychology, drawing on classic paradigms in neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) research, such as perceptual competition (e.g., binocular rivalry), threshold stimulation (e.g., visual masking), and residual visual processing (e.g., blindsight)—which collectively demonstrate that perceptual processing extends beyond phenomenal limits. Building on this interdisciplinary analysis, I respond to Phillips’ critiques of unconscious perception in three respects: (1) his definition excludes empirically supported instances of unconscious perceptual processing; (2) it presupposes a rigid conceptual link between perception and consciousness, ignoring their graded and context-dependent relation; and (3) it constrains empirical interpretation in ways that narrow the theoretical reach of perception research. Taken together, these arguments support a functionally grounded and inclusive framework of perception that bridges philosophy and cognitive science, showing that conscious and unconscious perception are continuous manifestations of a shared perceptual architecture.